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NOTES
INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND WASTE
DISPOSAL REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
Commercial waste management compames and the nuclear industry
have recently started negotiating with Indian tribes for the use of their
lands to store hazardous and nuclear waste. It is their hope that such
a measure will provide a solution to the 900 million tons of municipal
garbage, toxic waste and sewage sludge generated annually, in the
face of more and more landfill closings. Nuclear waste generators, in
particular, have the even more difficult task of finding a temporary
storage facility for 20,000 tons of high-level, toxic, radioactive materi-
als until permanent repositories are established.' There are complex
social, political and financial reasons which motivate tribal decisions
to enter into waste projects. While most tribes are rejecting offers to
develop commercial waste projects, some are welcoming them be-
cause they bring the promise of hundreds of millions of dollars.2 Since
few development opportunities exist and tribes suffer exorbitantly
high unemployment rates, especially for unskilled or semi-skilled
1. Michael Satchell, Trashing the Reservations? Native Americans are Tempted to
Take Waste Others Don't Want, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 1993, at 24 (criti-
cizing plans to build temporary facilities on reservations). See Edward Lippmann, On
Apache Homeland, Nuclear Waste Seen as Opportunity, WASH. POST, June 28, 1992, at
A3 (pointing out that by the time permanent sites are ready, 40,000 tons of waste will
have accumulated). A discussion of jurisdiction over regulation of nuclear waste dis-
posal is beyond the scope of this Note.
The terms Indian, Native American and aboriginal are used interchangeably by the
author for stylistic purposes.
2. Mathew L. Wald, Pile of Cash Awaits Site for Fuel Rods Indian Tribes Bid For
Nuclear Wastes, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 27,1993, at B1l (finding that the nuclear industry is
so desperate to find temporary nuclear storage sites that a tribe or county willing to
rent its land for temporary storage could collect up to fifty million dollars per year, for
a lease of twenty years). Wald emphasizes that the poor financial situation of tribes
makes them especially vulnerable to offers, since land is one of the few resources with
which tribe members have left to negotiate. Id. There are authorities, however, who
are in strong disagreement with this position. See SELECr COMMFrEE ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, WORKSHOP ON SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ON INDIAN LANDS, S. REP. No.
370, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992) (finding that the media has displaced public atten-
tion on commercial project development, and that the number of tribes considering
such projects has been grossly overstated); Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commer-
ctal Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal Projects on Indian Lands, 10 YALE J. ON
REG. 229, 229 (1993) (finding that "the media has created a steady drumbeat of rms-
informed stones claimng that Indian tribes and reservations alone have been targeted
by waste companies"); Catherme Baker Stetson & Kevin Gover, CERCLA Liability
and Regulation of Hazardous Waste on Indian Lands, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENV'T 24 (1993) (finding that only a few proposals have been acceptable by tribes).
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workers, it is not surprising that economic benefits weigh heavily into
decision-makmg.3
As of January 1993, sixteen tribes had applied for grants from the
Department of Energy to study the possibility of hosting nuclear
waste sites.4 There are currently more than 650 sites where solid
waste is stored on Indian lands5 and proposals to construct hazardous
waste facilities on those reservations are under way. Significantly,
few, if any, of the current waste sites are maintained in a manner con-
sistent with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),6
the federal regulatory program which provides a comprehensive
scheme for the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes.7
Under the recent RCRA amendments, almost all waste sites on reser-
vations are classified as open dumps.' Part of the reason tribes have
been unable to remedy waste problems or comply with standards is
their lack of eligibility for the type of support which states receive for
implementing and enforcing environmental laws. 9 Current estimates
indicate that it would take more than $167 million to clean-up the
existing open dumps,10 but without specific authorization by Congress
for environmental clean-up, it is difficult to determine where the
money will come from." Tribes are not the only communities deal-
mg with the host of environmental and social problems associated
3. Rep. Bill Richardson, Beating Drums Shameful History Must End; Accord Na-
tive Americans Justice, Reform, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Apr. 12, 1993, at A13 (finding
that conditions on reservations are increasingly disturbing). For instance, the unem-
ployment rate on reservations typically exceeds 80%, the teen suicide rate is four
times that of other ethnic groups and the Bureau of Indian Affairs estimates that
93,000 Indian people either live in substandard housing or are homeless. Id. See also
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ON THE PiNE RIDGE INDIAN RESERVATION, OVERSIGHT
HEARING, REPORT BEFORE THE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990) (testimony of Bill F Pearson, Associate Director, Office of
Environmental Health and Engineering, Indian Health Service) (finding that Indians
and Alaskan natives are suffering from some of the highest unemployment rates m
the world, with the highest levels of poverty).
4. Satchell, supra note 1, at 25.
5. S. REP. No. 370, supra note 2, at 2.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988).
7 Id.
8. S. REP. No. 370, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that because of new congressional
standards enacted in 1991, "only 2 of 108 tribal landfills complied with EPA require-
ments"). However, the members of the Committee on Indian Affairs found it un-
likely that any tribal landfills comply with new regulations which went into effect in
October 1993. Id.
9. Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One
Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Coun-
try, 63 U. CoLo. L. REv 933 (1992) (finding that there is no answer as to how to
cover costs for clean-up and proper operation).
10. S. REP. No. 370, supra note 2, at 2 (the Committee estimated that clean-up
costs would be so high on reservations because the new EPA criteria could lead to
closure of many disposal sites causing an increase m the maintenance costs for ex-
isting sites).
11. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 934.
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with disposal projects, which include diminishing landfill capacity' 2
and the "not-in-my-backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome.' 3 Clearly, one
must acknowledge that many communities across the nation are grap-
pling with health and safety problems posed by open dumps. How-
ever, when dealing with reservations, the issues of tribal sovereignty
and federal and state jurisdiction over environmental regulation also
come in to play. The development of commercial and non-commer-
cial waste facilities has also created some confusion as to what the
scope of environmental liability on reservations is, as well as who has
jurisdiction over the enforcement of environmental laws. 4 Although
tribes have the right to regulate waste disposal on their lands, they
have neither been required nor permitted to do so until recent court
decisions.'" Under RCRA, states presently do not have authority to
regulate tribal country. However, the tribes themselves do not have
express authority either.16 The need to resolve confusion about envi-
ronmental regulation on tribal lands is further exacerbated by the
proliferation of open, illegal dumping on reservations.17 Without clar-
ity about the scope and applicability of environmental laws on reser-
vations, tribes which are already destitute will find it increasingly
difficult to clean up existing and future sites, or to target illegal waste
dumpers.
Tus Note neither cnticizes nor endorses the creation of hazardous
waste disposal facilities on Native American reservations. It does,
however, address the need for clarity of environmental regulation and
how it applies to tribal lands. The decision to build waste disposal
facilities should be left entirely to the tribes themselves. To condemn
12. Stetson & Gover, supra note 2, at 24.
13. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 934.
14. Walter E. Stem, Environmental Regulation on Indian Lands: A Business Per-
spective, 7 NAT. RESOURCES AND ENV'T 20, 22 (1993) (although federal, state and
tribal governments each have regulatory power, states have been given the authority
to tax non-Indian business on reservations, but it is unclear whether states will be
given the power to generally regulate such businesses). See generally Walker & Go-
ver, supra note 2; Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development on Indian Reser-
vations: Overview of Tribal, State, and Federal Jurisdiction, 17 AM. INDiAN L. REv 71
(1992).
15. Stetson & Gover, supra note 2, at 25.
16. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that Congress
must expressly intend for tribal rights to be abrogated); Wasungton Dep't of Ecology
v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that Washington State did not have
jurisdiction to regulate tribal environmental problems on reservations within its bor-
ders because states had not been given express authority); infra Section Ila. See also
Robert Laurence, American Indians and the Environment. A Legal Primer for New
Comers, 7 NAT. RESOURCES AND ENV'T 3,4 (1993) (finding that tribal "sovereignty is
lost through voluntary surrender by tribes, through unilateral diminishment by Con-
gress, and by implication as found by the Courts") citing Oliphant v. Suquanush In-
dian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
17. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 934 (finding that for most Indian communi-
ties, the problem of open dumping on tribal lands is of much greater concern than the
prospects of building a commercial waste site).
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the decision to build facilities would be unduly paternalistic and would
deny what many call one of the few options for development and em-
ployment on reservations. 18 Still, the decision to enter the waste man-
agement business requires assurance that compliance with
environmental laws will be stringent. Without sufficient safeguards,
these economic endeavors may pose severe threats to the future well-
being of already dwindling Indian populations and to the health of the
environment m general.
Part I of this Note discusses the historic development of the federal
trust relationship with Indian tribes and the doctrine of tribal sover-
eign immunity It concludes that tribal governments historically pos-
sessed a greater degree of freedom from state governmental
interference than they do today, and, as such, had significantly more
control over their internal affairs. Part II analyzes the impact of two
recent Supreme Court decisions on federal, state and tribal junsdic-
tion of land-use and the limitations on tribal sovereignty today. This
section describes how modem courts have increasingly ignored sover-
eignty and eroded related principles, despite the intentions of Con-
gress and the executive branch to encourage tribal independence.
Part III discusses the applicability of federal environmental laws to
Indian lands and Indian tribes. This section considers the gap created
by both Congress' and EPA's treatment of Indian governments under
RCRA, and the resulting problems which have ensued. Part IV con-
siders several recent cases involving environmental liability on reser-
vations and concludes that RCRA must be amended to clarify the
extent of Indian jurisdiction in order to protect reservation residents
from the hazards of open dumping and allow them to properly deal
with potential liabilities associated with building commercial waste fa-
cilities. Lastly, Part V considers the charge that locating waste facili-
ties on reservations is an issue of environmental racism. This section
explores the possibility that building facilities on reservations is moti-
vated by industries which desire to exploit the economic situation of
tribes and the current loopholes in environmental law regarding regu-
lation of the tribal environment. This section concludes that tribes
should retain the ability to make informed decisions about commer-
cial waste industry development and should receive the proper techin-
cal support and guidance from the federal government.
I. HISTORIc DIVISION OF POWER OVER RESERVATIONS
The development of successful waste management projects on res-
ervations, whether commercial or non-profit, depends upon the
proper identification of the roles and interests of all governing parties
involved - the tribes themselves, the federal government, and the
states. Each party clearly has an interest in being the controlling
18. See generally Gover & Walker, supra note 9.
INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
party. The central issue in resolving the power conflict between the
different governing bodies is which of these has proper jurisdiction. A
brief look at the history of federal Indian law makes it easier to under-
stand the complexities of environmental regulation in Indian
territories. 19
Indian tribes maintain a umque relationship with the United States
government. Tribes purportedly retain sovereign status, yet are sub-
ject to substantial regulation by Congress.20 Thus, tribal governments
are not sovereign,2 in any traditional sense, over their ability to regu-
late activities within their borders. The extent of tribal sovereignty
has also dramatically changed over the course of the last 150 years,
with promises of recognition of tribal self-determination today juxta-
posed against the broad federal regulatory power of the past 2 The
evolution of the federal/Indian relationship reveals how the motiva-
tions and impacts of the law have often been contradictory and incon-
sistent, usually resulting in harm to the tribes.
A. Evolution of Tribal Sovereignty
The limitations on tribal sovereignty and on federal and state gov-
ernments were spelled out in the beginning of the nineteenth century,
when Chief Justice John Marshall devised the jurisdictional grants of
power in three pivotal cases: Johnson v. McIntosh,' Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia,24 and Worcester v Georgia.5 These cases, which have
19. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 207-17
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN]; MONROE E. PRICE &
ROBERT N. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (2d ed. 1983); Steven P Mc-
Sloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U.
REv L. & Soc. CHANGE 217 (1993) (in-depth history of American Indian Law).
20. Under the Constitution, Congress has plenary power to regulate Indian affairs.
Congress is specifically granted the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. In addition, Congress' main power to regulate Indian affairs has been derived
from the Treaty Clause, which grants exclusive power to the national government to
enter into treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 52.
21. The term sovereign is defined as "a person, body or state in which independ-
ent and supreme authority is vested " BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1395 (6th ed.
1990). Tribal governments should therefore, be considered "quasi-sovereign" given
the nature of the federal-tribal relationslup.
22. McSloy, supra note 19, at 242.
23. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
24. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
25. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See generally COHEN, supra note 18, at 52-59 (at-
tributing the development of the U.S. government's relationship with tribes to early
European colonizers). Cohen adds that tribal sovereignty and the rights of Indians to
maintain title to their land was widely recognized by international law in the six-
teenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Id. Treaties between Spanish, English
and Dutch colomsts with Indians were premised on the assumption that Indians had
title to land which they occupied, and that their consent was a prerequisite to acquisi-
tion of that land. Id. It was in the interests of early colonists to maintain friendly
relations with Indians because they wanted to ensure good trading partnerships and
because the Indian populations outnumbered many of the smaller colonial commum-
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come to be known as the "Marshall trilogy," recognized the sover-
eignty of Indians under traditional principles of international law.
The trilogy simultaneously delegated some regulatory power over tri-
bal lands to the federal government, and restricted the power of states
to interfere with tribal governance.26
In Johnson v. McIntosh, a group of plaintiffs claimed that they had
acquired title to a tract of land in Illinois which they had purchased
directly from the Piankeshaw Indians.27 The defendant also claimed
title to the same land which it purchased from the federal govern-
ment.2 The United States claimed that it had properly obtained the
land through a treaty with the Indians, and thus retained exclusive
power to confer title to the land.29 The issue before the Court in John-
son was whether Indian tribes retained authority to convey legal title
to land. The Court found in favor of the defendant, but set forth a
significant opinion about Indian property rights. °
ties). See McSloy, supra note 18, at 225 (finding that native American sovereignty, as
a legal matter, was more respected by colonizers than it has been for the last 150 years
by the U.S. government).
After the Revolutionary War, establishing peace with Indians was even more im-
portant to the foundling government. In a letter by George Washington to James
Duane, September 7, 1783, Washington called for a U.S. policy which would inimmize
bloodshed and fighting between Indians and colomalists and peaceful purchase of
their lands. In addition, the government embarked upon a series of treaties with
tribes to regulate Indian affairs. Congress passed the Trade and Intercourse Act m
1790; and amended it 1802; the government also established Government Trading
Houses to facilitate trade with tribes. In addition to economic motivations for a spe-
cial relationship with tribes, the government had some humanitarian reasons for sup-
porting a special relationship with Indians: "The principle of the Indian right to the
lands they possess being thus conceded, the dignity and interest of the nation will be
advanced by making it the basis of the future administration of justice towards the
Indian tribes " Report of Henry Knox, Secretary of War, on the Northwestern
Indians, June 15, 1789.
An additional motivation for U.S. policy toward Indians was to encourage assimila-
tion of Indians into Western society. Politicians hoped that by increasing friendly
relations, Indians would abandon their way of living: "In leading them [Indians] thus
to agriculture, to manufactures, and civilization; m bringing together their and our
sentiments, and in preparing them ultimately to participate in the benefits of our Gov-
ernment, I trust and believe we are acting for their greatest good." President Jeffer-
son on Indian Trading Houses, Jan. 18, 1803.
While there has been thorough historic investigation regarding the recognition of
Indian sovereignty, it is important to keep m mind that despite legal recognition of
the rights of Indians, the various colonizers and colonial governments were also re-
sponsible for the demise of thousands of Indians. See DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY (Francis Paul Prucha ed. 1975).
26. PRICE & CLINTON, supra note 19, at 5. See Mary Beth West, Natural Re-
sources Development on Indian Reservations: Overview of Tribal, State, and Federal
Jurisdiction, 17 AM. INDIAN L. Rnv. 71 (1992) (finding that greater legal protection
was afforded to tribes by the Marshall Court than today).
27. 21 U.S. at 572.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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The Court held that while discovery and conquest by white settlers
gave the government the "exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title
of occupancy," it concurrently gave the Indians some degree of sover-
eignty 3 1 Marshall explained that conquest gives the conqueror title
which cannot be denied.32 However, Marshall says, under principles
of "humanity" and where it is practicable, "the rights of the con-
quered to property should remain unimpaired ... ,"I Thus, according
to Marshall, Indians maintained some control over their land, while
the federal government retained ultimate control over conveyance of
title.34 Marshall's analysis indicated that one of the reasons why Indi-
ans were afforded some degree of sovereignty was that it was "imprac-
ticable" that Indians, as "fierce savages," would assimilate into white
society.35
The Court clarified the extent of tribal sovereignty in the two suc-
ceeding Cherokee cases. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,36 decided in
1831, the Court considered the ability of the Georgia government to
extend its laws over the Cherokee territories.37 Writing for the major-
ity, Marshall reasoned that since tribes were not foreign states in the
sense of the Constitution, the Court, under Article III, lacked jurisdic-
tion to redress the plaintiff's claims.38 More importantly, however,
Marshall's opinion stated that the Constitution gave the federal gov-
ernment, and not the states, the power to regulate Indian affairs.3 9 He
also characterized Indian territory as being protected by the federal
31. Id. at 574, 583.
32. But see FRANcIs JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA. INDIANS, COLONIAL-
ISM AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 15-16, 32 (1975) (harshly criticizing Marshall's
characterization of the Indians as fierce savages and the idea that white colonizers
discovered and conquered a wild land). As Jennings says: "Incapable of conquering
true wilderness, the Europeans were highly competent in the skill of conquering other
people, and that is what they did. They did not settle a virgin land. They invaded and
displaced a resident population." Id.
33. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588.
34. Id. at 602. Marshall stated: "It has never been contended, that the Indian title
amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been questioned." Id. at
603.
35. Id. at 588. See Sarah P Campbell, Note, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and the
Environment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 371, 373 (1993) (discussing Marshall's reasoning
that white man discovered America ignores the fact that Indians first lived here and
they had no voice in the decisions of white colonizers to take what they wanted.) This
author believes that the Court could have rejected principles of discovery and af-
forded greater protection to Indian rights.
36. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
37. This case arose while the federal government was pursuing a policy to force
Indians to move westward. The Georgia legislature passed the laws at issue to harass
Cherokees who refused to voluntarily move west. COHEN, supra note 19, at 81.
38. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18. The Court acknowledged that Indians have
"been uniformly treated as a state," but that they were not a domestic or foreign state
in any traditional sense. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 16.
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government from intrusions and likened it to "domestic dependent
nations."''4 Marshall explained that:
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which we must take effect in point of possession when
their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of
pupilage; their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian." They look to our government for protection;
rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their
wants; and address the president as their great father.4 '
Marshall stated that the relationship of Indians to the federal govern-
ment was "unlike that of any other two people in existence."' 2
A year later, in Worcester v. Georgia,43 the Court held that an In-
dian tribe's dependent status did not extinguish preexisting tribal
power to govern over its internal affairs.44 In Worcester, Georgia was
attempting to enforce a law which forbade non-Indians from living in
tribal territory without first obtaining a permit from the state.45 How-
ever, the Court held that Indian nations are distinct and "the laws of
[a state] can have no force" within the reservation boundaries.46
Worcester thus placed a huge limitation on state powers to regulate
within Indian territory. The decision reinforced the idea that tribes
were dependent on the federal government, while recognizing that
tribes had exclusive power to govern internal affairs as nations unless
the power was otherwise delegated by Congress or treaty.47
Marshall's opinions laid the groundwork for future treatment of
tribes and established a framework which left tribes somewhat auton-
omous, and placed constitutional limitations on federal and state gov-
ernment powers.48 While these cases clearly furthered the ability of
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 15.
43. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
44. Id. at 581.
45. Id. at 537.
46. Id. at 557 Chief Justice Marshall explained:
From the commencement of our government, Congress has passed acts to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians, winch treat them as nations,
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection
which treaties stipulate all these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is
still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct polit-
ical communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority
is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries winch
is not only acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States.
47. Id. This decision caused a great deal of political clamor, as there was enor-
mous opposition to the tribe. Historians have found some evidence that President
Jackson scorned the decision, saying "John Marshall made his law now let him enforce
it." COHEN, supra note 19, at 83 (quoting HoRACE GREELY, AMERICAN CONFLICT
106 (1865)).
48. See West, supra note 26 (providing an analysis of the early Supreme Court
decisions regarding tribes, and the historical development of caselaw in this field).
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colonizers to impose their own values and rules on Indians in their
native lands, they afforded some legal protection of Indian rights.49
The opinions developed the principles that the federal government
had a trust relationship with tribes, and that tribes were separate enti-
ties, over which jurisdiction was limited. In addition, these cases,
along with the Commerce Clause50 and the Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1790,51 codified federal power to conduct relations with Indians and
prohibited states from interfering or regulating without federal
approval.5 2
B. U.S. Policy Following the Marshall Opinions
Following the decisions by the Marshall Court, the federal govern-
ment embarked on a path toward maintaining separation of tribes
from states or settled territones.53 Relations with Indians were con-
ducted primarily through treaty-making under principles of interna-
tional law.5 4 The government passed scores of treaties with Indian
nations, partly to push tribes westward, so they would not interfere
with white claims to land5 5 and partly to strengthen white trade.56 In
addition, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830,57 which
49. McSloy, supra note 19, at 220 (finding that early treatment of Native Amen-
cans accorded much greater respect for their sovereignty). This commentator points
out that "Iflor the greater part of American history, Native nations were treated by
the United States as separate nations with whom treaties must be made." Id. But see
Indian Tribal Sovereignty and the Environment, supra note 35, at 373 (the author ar-
gues that Marshall's opinions may have recognized that tribes have some legal rights,
but he ignored how Indians would be affected by the rulings and the fact that Indians
were not given much choice about the demise of their freedom m their own lands).
50. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
52. McSloy, supra note 19, at 236.
53. See generally FRANcis P PRUCHA, THE INDIANS IN AMERICAN SocIErY:
FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE PRESENT 29-32 (1985)(detailed historical
analysis of U.S.-Indian relations); JENNINGS, supra note 32; Rennard Strickland, Ge-
nocide at Law: A Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience,
34 U. KAN. L. REv. 713 (1986) (finding that there are legally compelling reasons for
the federal government to recognize Indian nations' sovereignty).
54. McSloy, supra note 19, at 236-37.
55. 7 COHEN, supra note 19, at 66. See generally LAURENCE SCHMECKBIER, THE
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1927) (reports that the
government did not honor many of these treaties which created a great deal of fric-
tion and bloodshed). In President Andrew Jackson's annual message before Congress
on December 7, 1835, he called for removal of Indians, saying:
[i]t seems now to be an established fact that they cannot live in contact with
civilized community and prosper Independently of the treaty stipula-
tions into which we have entered with the various tribes for the usufructuary
rights they have ceded to us, no one can doubt the moral duty of the Gov-
ernment of the United States to protect and if possible to preserve and per-
petuate the scattered remnants of this race wich are left within our borders.
Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1835), in MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS, 1833-1841, at 171 (James D. Richardson ed. 1896).
56. McSloy, supra note 19, at 229.
57. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
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authorized the President to exchange eastern tribal Indian land for
western lands.58
The push westward, despite the promise of land, did not guarantee
Indians their own territory. By the mid-1800's, as white settlers
moved west, treaties granting Indians specific reservation areas were
also passed.59 Some officials argued that an allotment of land would
benefit Indians by protecting their rights, while accustoming them to
Western ideas about property rights, thus fostering their assimilation
into white society.60 However, these treaties were accorded little re-
spect, to the eventual detriment to Indians.61
Accordingly, the treaties did little to settle unrest or determine land
boundaries. Instead, aggression between white settlers and Indians
escalated, making assimilation of Indians even more implausible. In
the Report of the Doolittle Committee, January 26, 1867, Congress
acknowledged the declining American Indian population and attrib-
uted this decline to war, disease and the destruction of game, all
caused by the emigrating whites.62 These problems culminated in the
passage of one of the most detrimental pieces of legislation aimed at
eroding any semblance of tribal sovereignty. The General Allotment
Act63 was "a comprehensive attempt to create a new role for the In-
dian in American society."' 64 The Act granted the President the power
to allot reservation lands in severalty to tribal members. Under the
Act, tribal lands were held in trust for twenty-five years, but after that
time, tribe members received fee patents and could transfer the land
or sell it to non-Indians.65 In addition, American citizenship was
made available to Indians after completion of the allotment process or
when the restraints or alienation expired.66
The results of the General Allotment Act were devastating for
tribes. While the Act remained in force, some 90 million acres, ap-
proximately two thirds of the lands originally held by tribes, were lost
through the sale of "surplus" land or alienated through allotments.67
As a result of the land sales, and fee holdings by non-Indians, the
58. COHEN, supra note 19, at 81.
59. Id. at 78-92. As Cohen notes, this policy appeared to promote voluntary re-
moval, but military force was often used to accomplish the goal under Jackson's pol-
icy. Id at 91-92.
60. William Dole, Comm'r on Indian Affairs, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 37th Cong.,
3d Sess. 169-70 (1862), in DOcuMENTs OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, (Francis
Paul Prucha ed. 1975).
61. McSloy, supra note 19, at 243.
62. S. REP. No. 156, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., serial 1279, pp. 3-10.
63. See generally General Allotment (Dawes Act), ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1983))
[hereinafter General Allotment Act].
64. COHEN, supra note 19, at 130. See PRICE & CLINTON, supra note 19, at 77-81.
65. COHEN, supra note 19, at 130-31.
66. PRICE & CLINTON, supra note 19, at 81.
67 COHEN, supra note 19, at 614.
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power of tribal governments over reservations was severely dimin-
ished and their culture and customs came under attack.68
After widespread recognition of the failure of the General Allot-
ment Act in incorporating Indians into white society, the policy was
reversed under the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934,69 but the dam-
age was already done. The Indian Reorganization Act attempted to
revitalize tribal governments and granted "Indians living under Fed-
eral tutelage the freedom to organize for purposes of local self-gov-
ernment and economic enterpnse."70 However, a major impediment
to success of the policies remained unremedied - the new policy did
not return any of the lands alienated under the General Allotment
Act. Tribal power could not be regained if reservations were no
longer exclusively Indian country.
The gains of the Indian Reorganization Act were short-lived 7 and
the assimilationist and racist policies of the past were conjured up
again by the late 1940s, with members of the federal government call-
mg for total assimilation of Indians once again. 2 Thus, the call for
assimilation was silenced and repudiated again during the 1960s under
the Kennedy administration, when the President promised "[t]here
would be no change in treaty or contractual relationships without the
consent of the tribes concerned. No steps would be taken to impair
the cultural heritage of any group."7 3 During the early portion of this
period, Indians benefitted from federal programs which provided fi-
nancial assistance and from the passage of the Indian Civil Rights
Act.74 The period of self-determination which began in the 1960s con-
tinues to be the dominant paradigm today; however, problems and
inequalities are rampant.7 5
In addition, the concepts of tribal sovereignty and self-determina-
tion have undergone a complete change as a result of the flux in fed-
eral Indian law over the last century and a half.76 As one
commentator has noted, tribal sovereignty is no longer a concept with
much meaning:
68. Id.
69. Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988)).
70. PRICE & CLINTON, supra note 19, at 284.
71. Id. at 85.
72. Id. (COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF Gov-
ERNMENTI INDIAN AFFARS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 77-80 (1949)).
73. Id. at 86.
74. Id. at 86-88 (briefly discussing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (1988)). A more detailed discussion of these policies is beyond the scope of
this Note.
75. See Richardson, supra note 3 (conditions on reservations are intolerable, with
the overwhelming poverty, mismanagement by federal agencies, insufficient aid and
homelessness).
76. McSloy, supra note 19, at 223.
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This vision of the separate, sovereign status of Native nations no
longer describes the place of Indian peoples m American law. In
derogation of their long-recognized powers of inherent sovereignty,
Native Americans are today subject to the unlimited legislative au-
thority of Congress to pass any law it pleases, including those which
restrict or eliminate the powers of Native governments. Due to the
"plenary" nature of this power and the Supreme Court's concomi-
tant judicial deference, the Court has rarely if ever limited the
power of Congress since its first attempts to exert legislative power
over Native people m the late nineteenth century.77
It is iromc that Indian tribes are called sovereign today, and that for
the last thirty years the federal government has pledged to encourage
policies of self-determination. Given Congress' unchecked power
over reservations, it may be difficult for tribal governments to regain
strength. However, by specifically delegating certain powers to tribes,
such as environmental regulation, tribes can begin to emerge as self-
governing bodies. The next section explores the challenges to sover-
eignty caused by Supreme Court decisions concerning the govern-
ment's regulatory power over reservations.
II. LAND-USE COURT DECISIONS
A. Erosion of Tribal Power
The modern Court has set forth several opinions which further
erode the power of tribal governments.78 These decisions have found
that the "checkerboard" nature of reservations,79 with huge non-In-
dian areas, means that Native Americans have less governing power
over the uses of reservation land, because their title is no longer
exclusive.
There have been no Supreme Court decisions to date involving en-
vironmental regulation of reservations, but two recent rulings regard-
Ing land use may foreshadow how the Court could decide a case on
solid or hazardous waste regulation on reservations.8 0 While there is a
difference between land use planning and environmental regulation,
limiting the ability of tribes to control land use creates hurdles for
tribes attempting to exert primary enforcement over the reservation
77. Id. (footnotes omitted).
78. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (Court held that Congress authorized
the regulation of the sale of liquor on reservations and m the process found that the
federal government is traditionally responsible for the uniform regulation of alcohol);
Duro v. Rema, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (Court held that Indians are not full sovereigns
and do not have jurisdiction over a criminal action against a non-Indian who killed an
Indian on a reservation).
79. This term has been used to describe the character of reservations since the
policies of the General Allotment Act which led to the break-up of reservations into
areas with Indian and non-Indian ownership.
80. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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environment."s This is because "a government that has lost the au-
thority to zone its lands - the authority to control land use planning
- has lost as well the full capacity to control environmentally harmful
land uses. '' m In addition, the cases indicate that the Court's view
about the federal/tribal relationship is somewhat contrary to the prin-
ciples of tribal self-determination, which has been a widely recogmzed
objective of the federal government for the past three decades.8 3
In Montana v. United States,' the court held that tribes retain inher-
ent sovereign power to exert civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on res-
ervations. However, that power exists only in limited situations. In
Montana, the issue before the Court was whether the Crow Indian
tribe had the power "to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on lands within its reservation lands owned in fee simple by non-Indi-
ans."8 5 The Court reversed a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and ruled against the Crow Indians.
The Supreme Court found that the Crow Indians had no authority
under the treaties creating the tribe's reservation to regulate the con-
duct of non-Indians, and that their inherent power was very re-
stricted. 6 The Court indicated that the tribe, nonetheless, retained
power to regulate activities of non-Indians in such areas as taxation or
contractual relations.87
Justice Stewart set forth the test to determine whether a tribe re-
tamed regulatory power or lost it to the state or federal government.8 8
Under the test, the tribe retained power to regulate the conduct of
non-Indians on lands within the reservation owned in fee simple by
non-Indians if the "conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe."' 89 The test creates some confusion because there is no
bright line rule to determine what type of conduct falls within tribal
regulation. The Court found that regulating hunting and fishing ac-
tivities of non-Indians on non-Indian land within the reservation did
81. Judith V Royster, Environmental Protection and Native American Rights:
Controlling Land Use Through Environmental Regulation, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y
89 (1991) (discussing the similarities of land-use and environmental regulation and the
obstacles to environmental control posed by Supreme Court decisions).
82. Id.
83. See discussion infra Section III, footnotes 115-25 and accompanying text.
84. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
85. Id. at 547.
86. Id. at 558-59. The Court referred to the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat.
649, but interpreted it much more narrowly than the lower court did. It found that
the treaty "arguably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to control fishing and
hunting on those lands. But that authority could only extend to land on which the
Tribe exercises 'absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.'" Id. (footnote
omitted).
87. Id. at 565.
88. Id. at 566.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
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not pose a threat to the integrity of the tribe.90 However, by losing
the right to regulate such activities, a tribe is divested of physical con-
trol of land it has relied on for subsistence over the centuries.
In addition, the majority of the Court held that Congress could have
expressly extended tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians by including
such power when it defined "Indian country" m 18 U.S.C. section
1151. The Court found that without such an expression, the tribe's
dependent status led to a divestiture of sovereignty. 91 However, the
majority's interpretation of history was harshly criticized in Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion. Blackmun contended that the history
and language used in negotiating dealings all indicated that the terri-
tory in question was exclusively subject to Indian jurisdiction.92
B. The Court's Ever-Narrowing Construction of Tribal Sovereignty
The Montana decision was affirmed and tribal sovereignty was even
more narrowly construed eight years later by the Court in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation.93 In Brendale,
the Court held that the Yakima tribes had lost the authority to zone
fee lands in a reservation's open area which had significant ownership
by non-Indians.94 The case involved two independent proposed de-
velopments on the Yakima reservations by non-Tribe members and
the county board of commissioners' conclusions that neither project
required an environmental impact statement (EIS).95 The Tribe
brought an action to assert exclusive authority to zone reservation
territory. 96
The Court held that tribes cannot have extensive governing power
over non-Indians because they are dependents of the United States
government. Justice White found, like the Court in Montana, that
tribes had been divested of the power to govern non-Indians since the
conquest by European settlers and the subsequent treaties which lim-
ited their jurisdiction.97 Justice White followed the Montana conclu-
sion that "[the Tribe's] treaty rights must be read in light of the
subsequent alienations of those lands,"9 and that it was unlikely that
"Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing alloted lands
90. Id.
91. Id. at 564. But see West, supra note 14, at 79 (finding that the Court's view "is
certainly a far cry from Marshall's model m wich the 'external sovereignty' lost by
tribes involved the power to establish relations with foreign nations").
92. Montana, 450 U.S. at 569-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See also West, supra note 14, at 82 (finding that Justice
White's majority opimon stated the Montana test more rigidly than this case).
94. The non-Indians had acquired significant portions of the Yakima reservation
under the General Allotment Act. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422.
95. Id. at 419.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 422-23.
98. Id. at 422 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 561).
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would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose
of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal govern-
ment."99 Justice White explained that although the Court recognized
that discrimination was a motivation of the General Allotment Act, its
ruling intensified its discriminatory effect by reducing tribal power
over non-Indians within the reservation territory."° The Court also
rejected the argument that the Indian Reorganization Act restored
tribal rights to exclusive use of their lands. 10'
It would not have been implausible for the Court to disavow the
policies of the past which called for complete assimilation of Indians
and to recognize the Indian right to regulate within the boundaries of
tribal territory. As the dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun points
out, the Court's decision undermines the explicit federal government
policy to promote tribal autonomy ' 0 2
Justice Blackmun rejected the Court's analysis that Congress must
expressly delegate tribal authority, saying that until the Montana deci-
sion, the Court had adhered to Chief Justice John Marshall's construc-
tion of tribal sovereignty. Justice Blackmun wrote:
Tune and again we stated that, while Congress retains authority to
abrogate tribal sovereignty as it sees fit, tribal sovereignty is not ex-
plicitly divested except in those limited circumstances pnncipally in-
volving external powers of sovereignty where the exercise of tribal
authority is necessarily mconsistent with the tribes' dependent
status.No
Justice Blackmun also criticized Justice White's interpretation of
United States v Wheeler,'"4 that tribal regulatory authority regarding
non-Indians was necessarily divested, and concluded that Wheeler
held that only "specific aspects of inherent sovereignty., have been
divested . .1.0.5
The Brendale Court used a more narrowly defined test in determin-
ing whether tribes have a protectable governing interest over reserva-
tion territory than did the Montana Court. 0 6 Justice White wrote that
the prefacing of the Montana opinion's exception recognizing sover-
eignty by the word "may" "indicates . . that a tribe's authority need
not extend to all conduct that 'threatens or has some direct effect on
99. Id. at 423 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9).
100. Id. at 423-24.
101. Id. at 423.
102. Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 451-52 citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978); Colville,
447 U.S. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
104. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
105. Id. at 452 n.3.
106. Id. at 449-50. See also West, supra note 14, at 82 (finding that the Brendale
Court required that an interest "must be demonstrably senous and must imperil the
political integrity, economic security or the health and welfare of the tribe," whereas
the Montana Court's ruling was not as ngid).
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the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe,' but instead depends on the circumstances."' 10 7
C. Implications of Land Use Decisions on Environmental Decisions
Many environmentalists have pointed out the dangerous implica-
tions of the Montana and Brendale decisions.'08 These two cases to-
gether are a full frontal attack on tribal sovereignty and make it
impossible for a government to engage mn comprehensive long-term
planning and development because there is no way to control how
land is used within its temtory. 0 9 By restricting tribal power to areas
which are predominantly Indian, the Court is really creating the po-
tential for "checkerboard jurisdiction" - meaning that states or coun-
ties would have jurisdiction over certain patches of reservations where
there is a significant non-Indian population." 0 Also, this may mean
that within an area of a few miles, there could be state land use regula-
tion interspersed with tribal regulation, which from a practical stand-
point creates a very ineffective and inefficient model, with no
uniformity of governance."'
By having more than one body with power to determine proper
uses of land, comprehensive long-range planning is extremely diffi-
cult." 2 As the dissent m Brendale points out, zoning power should
have fallen within the interests protected by the majority test since it
threatens the tribe's ability to effectively plan or prevent harmful uses
of land. 13 The uncertainties about which land uses are deemed ap-
propriate also create distrust between the governing bodies. For ex-
ample, state hunting regulations may be far less stringent or disruptive
to Indian practices. Indeed, it would be difficult for tribes to feel that
their power is more than nominal.
Another problem posed by the Court's land use decisions is that
they make the possibility of business developments on reservations
difficult. According to one commentator:
Loss of tribal authority over non-member lands can also affect the
economy and health of a tribe. Indian reservations contain rich
mineral deposits and large amounts of oil, gas, and low-sulfur coal.
Development of these resources is important to Indian tribes for
improving their econormc situation. The potential impact on Indian
health and welfare which development of these resources can cause
107. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429.
108. See generally West, supra note 14; ROYSTER, supra note 81; Gover & Walker,
supra note 9.
109. ROYSTER, supra note 81, at 91.
110. Id.
111. Id-
112. Id.
113. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This fundamental sover-
eign power of local governments to control land use is especially vital to Indians, who
enjoy a umque historical and cultural connection to the land.") (citations omitted).
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greatly exceeds the effects of subdivisions such as those at issue in
Brendale. 14
The Montana and Brendale cases together reveal the reluctance of
the current Supreme Court in recognizing a tribe's inherent authority
to regulate its internal affairs. By handing down such restrictive deci-
sions, the Court has created a setting which could make environmen-
tal regulation very difficult. While environmental concerns could
arguably fall under the protected interests of tribes since such regula-
tion affects both the health and economy of tribes, the Court may still
be reluctant in affirming the Tribe's ability to regulate given its appar-
ent resistance to the issue of Indian sovereignty In addition, since
most reservations today have substantial non-Indian populations, the
Court may also limit the tribe's regulatory authority for the same rea-
sons set out in Brendale - that the Indians lost the power to regulate
over non-Indian areas.
III. CONoGESS AND EPA's TREATMENT OF TRIBES
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance in upholding tribal sover-
eignty, Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency have in-
creasingly upheld policies encouraging self-determination and tribal
sovereignty in dealing with environmental issues.115 In addition, in
1983, President Ronald Reagan affirmed that U.S. policy would en-
courage tribal self-determination and he stated that the United States
would work in a government-to-government relationship with
tribes.116 In 1984, EPA echoed this statement, saying it recognized
tribes as sovereign governments with exclusive power over their tern-
tories, and pledged that it would also help tribes create proper stan-
dards and develop management bodies for reservations. 17
However, until 1986, there was no mention of Indian tribes, or how
they should be regulated, in environmental statutes passed by Con-
gress."18 Thus, these laws which set up national regulations and dele-
gate power to states to take the lead in enforcement, did not make any
provisions for treatment of tribal governments and did not give states
primary authority for enforcement either. The omission has had ma-
jor implications for tribes, since constitutionally Congress is required
114. Craighton Goeppele, Note, Solutions for Uneasy Neighbors: Regulating the
Reservation Environment After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989), 65 WASH. L. REv 417, 431 (1990).
115. See mfra notes 117, 125 and accompanying text.
116. See McSloy, supra note 19, at 220 n.16 citing President Reagan's Policy State-
ment on Indian Policy, 1 RONALD REAGAN PUB. PAPERS 96, 96 (Jan. 24, 1983). This
statement was reaffirmed by the Bush Administration as well. President Bush's Proc-
lamation 6407 - Year of the Amencan Indian, 28 WKLY. COM. PRES. Doc. 384,385
(Mar. 2, 1992).
117. EPA Policy for the Admimstration of Environmental Programs on Indian Res-
ervations (Nov. 4, 1984).
118. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 934.
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to explicitly intend, either through express provisions m laws or
through the legislative history, to abrogate tribal sovereignty m order
for states to extend jurisdiction over them.119 Without proper provi-
sion for tribes, uniform enforcement of environmental laws faced an
enormous challenge since most Indian nations are located within state
borders and generally include portions of cities or towns within their
borders as well.' 20 Thus, states could not claim power to exert envi-
ronmental control, because Congress had not expressed an intention
to allow states this power; and tribal governments could not exert con-
trol - at least practically, because they did not receive appropriate
funding or guidance. 2' In addition, most regulations require states to
establish standards which the EPA would review; since there were no
similar provisions for tribes, it was unclear as to how tribal regulations
would be reviewed.
Since 1986, most major environmental regulations have been
amended with provisions specifically addressing tribes. The Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (or the Clean Water Act),'2 Safe Drink-
ing Water Act,"z and Clean Air Act 124 all grant EPA authorization to
treat tribes as states for the purposes of the regulation.'" In addition,
by including tribes as states in the statutes, tribes are eligible to re-
ceive grant money as a participant in these programs. Funding for
enforcement and implementation of programs is essential for mean-
ingful regulation. 26 Without funding, tribes have no way of develop-
ing proper standards or monitoring the health of the environment.
119. See Stetson & Gover, supra note 2, at 25.
120. Leslie Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native American
Lands? Looking Beyond Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69,
72 (1987). The author notes that most reservations include miles of non-Indian land
and large non-Indian populations.
121. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 934 ("[T]ribal amendments will be necessary
before tribes will be eligible under RCRA for any federal grant or contract assistance
to deal with their waste problems.").
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988).
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7400-7642 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
125. Under these statutes, the EPA Administrator is authorized to treat tribes as
states if:
1. [T]he Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial gov-
ernment duties and powers;
2. [T]he functions to be exercised by the Indian Tribe pertain to the man-
agement and protection of water resources which are held by an Indian
tribe, held by the United States in trust for the Indians
3. [T]he Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Admin-
istrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner
consistent with the terms and purposes of this chapter and of all applicable
regulations.
33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7602(r) (1988 &
Supp. II 1991).
126. Walker & Gover, supra note 2, at 236.
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Under CERCLA, tribes are treated like states as well. However,
CERCLA differs from the other statutes because it confers upon EPA
greater power to assist tribes. It provides the power "to enter into
cooperative agreements with, and provide financial assistance to,
tribes, [and] authorizes tribes to recover costs incurred in carrying out
response actions from persons responsible for R 5.3(b)(ili) re-
leases .... "127 Tribal liability also seems to be limited, since tribes are
treated as states but are not expressly liable under the statute.12s
However, there is some disagreement among commentators whether
tribal liability will be recognized by the courts.' 29
By treating tribes as states under the law, tribes regain the ability to
regulate and govern over their own lands despite the courts' reluc-
tance to recognize sovereignty. Thus, environmental regulations
favoring sovereignty assure the tribes that if they do undertake waste
projects, they have the full authority to proceed without fear of
liability.
B. RCRA's Ambiguities
Unlike other environmental regulations, the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA)130 has not yet been amended to in-
clude specific treatment of tribes. Several attempts have been made
in the last few years to amend the Act in Congress, but these attempts
have failed. 3 '
RCRA was originally passed in 1976, making it one of the first com-
prehensive environmental regulatory schemes. 32 RCRA devises a
"cradle to grave" scheme for the storage, disposal, treatment and
transport of hazardous waste. 33 In addition, it defines hazardous
waste and the properties of waste which would classify it as such,
127. David Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and En-
force Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations, 23 ENvTrt. L. REP. 10,579, 10,584
(providing a very detailed analysis of the statutes and how they have been amended
to include tribes) (footnotes omitted). The author concludes that EPA is extremely
committed to encouraging tribal sovereignty. Id.
128. Stetson & Gover, supra note 2, at 26.
129. Id. at 24. "Nothing in SARA, however, suggests that tribes now are to be
subject to CERCLA liability. The fact that tribes are to be treated as states for cer-
tam purposes but are not specifically subjected to liability indicates that Congress did
not mean to subject tribes to CERCLA liability." Id. at 26.
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988).
131. Telephone interview with Eric Eberhart, Legislative Assistant, Committee on
Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C. RCRA amendments from the Committee have
failed three times. Committee members believe that one problem has been that many
Congressmen fail to recognize the government's obligation to provide specific protec-
tions for Indian governments given the histonc evolution of the Federal-Indian
relationship.
132. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
IcY LAW 369 (2d ed. 1991).
133. Id.
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along with requirements for generators, transporters and waste man-
agers to identify whether their waste is hazardous.'3
Under RCRA, states apply for EPA approval of their regulatory
programs but the final authority over regulation remains vested in
EPA.135 Thus, states are given the power to take the lead in regulating
hazardous waste under RCRA, but are required to meet the mmnmum
standards set out by EPA. 36 In addition, EPA reviews state initiatives
and may attempt to enforce more stringent standards. On the other
hand, states are given much more exclusive control over solid waste as
compared to hazardous waste.' 37 EPA does not serve as a backup en-
forcer if a state fails to regulate solid waste properly.138
While RCRA provides a framework for dividing state and federal
power, it does not provide any detailed explanation or authorization
to treat tribes as states. Thus, technically there is no body vested with
primary governing power over reservations. Without explicit treat-
ment of tribes within the statute, it remains unclear who has jurisdic-
tion over reservations. RCRA applies to Indians only through its
definition of mumcipalities. 139 A major implication of this omission is
that there is a gap in regulating tribal lands because of the statute's
ambiguities. As one commentator explains:
Because state standards and permitting procedures do not apply to
Indian reservations and RCRA does not anticipate tribal regulatory
programs, there is effectively a regulatory void on many reserva-
tions. Other than federal court enforcement of the open dumping
prohibition, the statute does not offer any means for the enforce-
ment of substantive standards on Indian reservations. 40
Thus, RCRA imposes liability on the tribe without giving it the type
of money granted to states under the Act.141
IV. COURT CONFUSION OVER RCRA's APPLICATION TO TRIBES
A. Liability Issues Under RCRA
An exploration of case law reveals judicial confusion and the extent
of intervention and liability for tribes as a result of the confusion. The
first major case dealing with liability under RCRA was Washington
Department of Ecology v. EPA. 42 In this case, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed EPA's decision that states could not assert
134. Walker & Gover, supra note 2, at 237.
135. Stetson & Gover, supra note 2, at 26.
136. Id.
137 Id.
138. Id.
139. Walker & Gover, supra note 2, at 243.
140. Stetson & Gover, supra note 2, at 26.
141. See supra notes 10-11.
142. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
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jurisdiction to regulate under RCRA on reservations. 143 However,
the holding was limited to the question of whether states can regulate
Indians on reservations and did not answer whether non-Indians were
subject to state regulation."' Another problem with the decision is
that while it recognized the limits of a state's ability to regulate haz-
ardous waste on reservations, it did not remedy the void left by the
statute.
In Washington, the state sued for RCRA control over the reserva-
tions within its borders to ensure uniform treatment of waste. 45 EPA
pronounced that RCRA grants states the authority to implement their
own regulatory programs; however, this power did not provide ex-
press authority to regulate reservations. 46 The court also upheld the
EPA Administrator's finding that RCRA does not authorize states to
regulate on reservations. 47
The state may make a strong argument that it needs control over
the reservation environment given the current environmental
problems on tribal lands and because regulation on tribal lands affects
the neighboring areas within a state's borders.148 However, as the
tribes in Montana indicated, Indians have serious concerns about state
intrusion because they fear state control could lead to even more
dumping on tribal grounds. 49
Following the decision in Washington, two RCRA cases involving
tribes have produced even more confusing results. These cases held
that tribes are liable for cleaning up and protecting the reservation
environment despite RCRA's ambiguities and the omission of tribes
from the statute.
In Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,150 the Eighth
Circuit upheld a lower court decision that the BIA, Indian Health Ser-
vice and Ogalala Sioux Tribe were liable for failure to bring the Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation dump sites into compliance with the re-
quirements of RCRA. 151 In this case, two tribe members brought suit
against the tribe, among others, for failing to supervise over a dozen
hazardous sites on the reservation and for creating a serious health
and environmental threat.'52 The complaint alleged that most of the
dump sites were located near houses, schools, streams or springs, with
twelve sites unfenced, six without sanitary trenches and that fires had
143. Id. at 1466.
144. Id. at 1468.
145. Id. at 1467.
146. Id. at 1469.
147 Id. at 1467.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 1470.
150. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
151. Id. at 1095.
152. Id.
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occurred on all the sites.1 53 In addition, it charged that there was an
enormous threat of contamination to tribe members and that this ex-
posure to waste posed a great danger to humans and wildlife. 54
The tribe argued that it was immune to suit since there was no ex-
press provision within RCRA abrogating tribal sovereignty.' 55 How-
ever, the Court found that sovereign immunity was waived because
Congress' intent in passing RCRA was to provide uniform enforce-
ment of environmental laws.'5 6 In addition, the court held that
RCRA applies to Indians through the citizen suit provision, 57 saying
that citizen suits are permitted against any person alleged to be in
violation of the statute. The court also noted that the definition of
"person" under the statute includes municipalities, winch in turn in-
cludes tribes.158
The court also found that although tribes have jurisdiction over civil
actions, the plaintiffs were not required to commence the lawsuit in
tribal court because RCRA does not require the exhaustion of tribal
remedies. 5 9 Instead, the court stated that RCRA provides federal
court jurisdiction over such claims. Thus, the court ignored principles
of tribal sovereignty and the need for express treatment of Indians by
Congress to waive immunity.
The court apportioned seventy-five percent of the clean-up costs to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service, and twenty-
five percent of the costs to the tribe. 6 ' The court refused to excuse
tribal liability since the tribe operated the sites in conjunction with the
two federal agencies. The federal agencies were primarily liable for
clean-up, according to the court, because of "the existence of the gen-
eral trust relationship between these agencies and the Tribe."''
A federal judge similarly held that Indian sovereign immunity is
waived under provisions of the Clean Water Act and RCRA in a case
last year. Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Salt River Pima-Mar-
copa Indian Community"62 may be the most far reaching case to find
environmental liability for tribes under a citizen suit. 63
153. Id. at 1096.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1096-97
157. Id. at 1097 citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A).
158. Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1097 citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15).
159. Id. at 1097-98.
160. Id. at 1100. See also Mark J. Connot, Note, Blue Legs v. United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs: An Expansion of BIA Duties Under the Snyder Act, 36 S.D. L. REv
382, 387 (1990-91).
161. Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1100.
162. 827 F Supp. 608 (D. Ariz. 1993).
163. David Hoye, Judge: Tribe Can be Sued Over Landfill, PHOENIX GAzrE,
July 16, 1993, at B8; Anthony Sommer, Landfill Pact Puts Limits on Dumping Tribe,
Groups Reach Accord Pending Trial, PHOENiX GAzEI, Jan. 27, 1993, at B1.
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The case was brought by two citizen groups after five truckloads of
debris from the Indian-run Tn-City landfill washed into the Salt River
in Arizona after heavy rams in January 1992.14 Environmental
groups charged that the debris caused severe groundwater contamina-
tion and would cost up to four million dollars to clean up.165 In addi-
tion, plaintiffs charged that the landfill was being operated in violation
of RCRA and sought injunctive relief to prevent use of the landfill
until it complied with environmental standards. 166
Despite the defendant's argument that "no remedy may be sought
against an Indian tribe 'unless Congress has explicitly and unambigu-
ously waived the sovereign immunity of the Indian tribal govern-
ment,' "67 the court followed the analysis of the Blue Legs court and
held that tribes can be sued under RCRA. 6 s
B. Need to Clarify and Amend RCRA
The Blue Legs and Salt River courts held that Indian tribes are sub-
ject to suit despite the fact the RCRA does not expressly treat tribes
as states which can undertake management programs. However,
these decisions, along with the Washington decision, leave many unan-
swered questions. The Washington court denied state jurisdiction, but
did not acknowledge tribal jurisdiction as did the later two cases. In
addition, these cases seem unduly harsh, given the enormous liabilities
and the implications for tribal immunity. By finding RCRA applica-
ble to tribes, modern courts are further eroding sovereignty principles
and the requirement that Congress expressly waive sovereign
immunity.
These decisions may be necessary to protect the environment and to
ensure that dumping on reservations does not go unpunished, but
their impact is very harsh. Tribes are quickly loosing ground for
self-governance, and these decisions are hastening the process. How-
ever, by amending RCRA and giving tribes the authority to govern
waste problems, tribal power may actually be bolstered. 69 Indians
would then gain greater governing power over their lands because
they would be the bodies responsible for regulation and could decide
more easily whether to undertake waste projects.
Further, without amendments to RCRA, tribes will not receive the
benefits which states currently receive, but will be subject to the same
164. Hoye, supra note 163. See also William W Quinn, Jr., Federal Environmental
and Indian Law Confluent, 29 AIZ. AT'y 19 (Dec. 1992).
165. Pamela Manson, Tribe Loses Bid to Avoid Lawsuit, ARIz. REPUBLIC, July 16,
1993 at B3 (estimates that cost of cleaning up debns and any groundwater contamina-
tion from the area may cost between two and four million dollars).
166. Id. at 608.
167. Id. at 610 (quoting Defendant's Reply at 6).
168. Id. at 610-11.
169. See ROYSTER, supra note 81, at 96.
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liability.170 Tribes are not provided the same funds for cleaning up
sites or devising standards. If EPA and Congress are truly committed
to improving tribal government regulation and promotion of the
health of Indians and those who live in neighboring communities, they
must take the lead in helping tribes establish standards and the means
to enforce them. Without the support of EPA, it will be difficult for
tribes to engage in meaningful business arrangements because they
will not have the ability to assure businesses or the surrounding com-
munities that they can protect the environment.
V. SHOULD COMMERCIAL WASTE PROJECTS ON RESERVATIONS
BE SUPPORTED?
A. The Question of Environmental Racism
Environmental racism is a broad-ranging issue of which our society
is slowly becoming more conscious. Environmental racism includes
conscious industrial decision-making winch may place certain poor or
minority commumties at a greater risk of exposure to toxins like lead,
air pollution or waste.17 It also includes the inability of environmen-
tal regulators, legislators and conservation groups to effectively deal
with issues winch affect predominantly minority groups. Whether
such harmful environmental decisions are conscious or unconscious, it
is clear that greater attention needs to be paid to the fact that certain
groups bear unfair and unhealthy burdens.
Generally, when we speak of environmental racism, the target
group or community has had little or no choice in decision-making
which adversely effects them. Many environmental justice crusaders
have discussed how political or economic disempowerment has left
some communities particularly vulnerable to harmful practices of in-
dustry and city planners. It is more difficult to determine whether
racism is involved in cases where the target group has made an affirm-
ative and informed decision to undertake an environmentally contro-
versial project. Thus, the decision by some tribes to host hazardous or
nuclear waste storage facilities poses some difficult questions which
some activists believe boil down to issues of environmental racism.
Others claim that racism is not a factor in commercial waste manage-
ment development on reservations, and that tribes should have the
right to choose whether to undertake such projects because they are
economically beneficial, and because tribes are sovereign and can
make decisions free from outside judgments.'72
170. See supra text accompanying note 9.
171. In 1990, an EPA study concluded that minority groups bear a disproportionate
burden of environmental exposures. Michael Weisskopf, Minorities' Pollution Risk is
Debated, Some Activists Link Exposure to Racism, WASH. Posr, Jan. 16, 1992, at A25.
172. The issue of open dumps on reservations and the failure of Congress to allo-
cate proper funding and to help tribes develop regulatory bodies on reservations may
be a clearer case of environmental racism. The next section, however, is limited to a
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B. Commercial Waste Projects as Another Blow to Indians
One critic of commercial waste projects has charged that Indians
are being deceived by the waste industry, as their ancestors were
deceived by colonialists. "Corporate waste brokers proposing landfill
and disposal factories on 20th century tribal reservations are not un-
like the caravans of English, French, and Spanish traders in the 18th
and 19th centuries who were led into town by Indian leaders on horse-
back."173 This commentator believes Indians are being lulled into a
false sense of security about what really awaits them in entering into
waste projects.174
The media has also charged that Indians are being lured into ac-
cepting the waste which no one else in the country wants. Some ac-
counts claim that the NIMBY syndrome has so pervasively affected
most Americans that toxins, nuclear waste and landfills have become
taboo topics.175 By turning to Indians, waste producers can take ad-
vantage of communities which want, and need economic stimulus
without encountering much political opposition. Critics also claim
that industry, looking to dispose of waste finds reservations especially
appealing because disposal on tribal lands is not subject to stringent
regulatory standards by either state or tribal regulatory bodies.176
Some opponents of tribal waste facilities believe that there may not
even be a substantial benefit from business dealings with the commer-
cial waste industry; that gains accrue only to industry and the tribal
leaders who have the power to arrange the deals, and not to the tribe
as a whole.'77
Representative Bill Richardson (D-New Mexico), Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Native American Affairs, has stated that fed-
eral and private programs which are aimed at building nuclear, solid
and hazardous waste facilities on reservations should not be contin-
ued.'78 Instead, he has called for the institution of Indian develop-
discussion of commercial waste project siting. See generally Rennard Strickland &
Mana Protti, The Dilemma of Preserving Tribal Culture and Promoting Resource De-
velopment: A Bibliographic Essay, 7 NAT. RESOURCES AND ENV'T 34 (1993) (refer-
encing tribal, historic and federal Indian law materials).
173. Scott Morrison & LeAnne Howe, The Sewage of Foreigners, 39 FED. B. NEws
& J. 370, 371 (1992).
174. Id. at 377.
175. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 935.
176. One commercial waste consultant, who proposed a $90 million deal with the
Tobhono O'odham Indians m Phoenix, said that he sought the reservation location
because his client did not want to "have to go through the headaches of city and
county zoning regulations." Edythe Jensen, Waste Plant Proposed as Landfill Sub
Reservation Site Stirs Opposition, ARiz. REPuB3LIC/PHOENLX GAZETrE, Sept. 7, 1990,
at B1.
177 Some authors have criticized tribal leaders and governments for being less
democratic and improperly motivated. See Morrison & Howe, supra note 173, at 371-
72 (finding that "[t]oday the Chief pulls up in a black Cadillac with tinted windows
flanked by his non-Indian financial manager).
178. Richardson, supra note 3, at A13.
1994] 455
456 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
ment banks and enterprise zones, programs that create industry
without posing environmental and health risks. 79 Senator Thomas
Daschle (D-South Dakota) concurs, saying that developing waste in-
dustries does not address the long-term problems facing tribes. Das-
chle finds that problems like poverty, poor governance and education,
and unemployment on reservations need to be immediately ad-
dressed. "The real irony is that those on the reservation are willing to
give up what has been most sacred throughout history for the sake of
economic development... show[ing] ... how desperately they want to
find jobs."' 8 °
C. Waste Projects Promote Needed Development
Proponents of Indian waste projects respond to these charges by
arguing that critics are unduly paternalistic and simplistic in their anal-
yses.18' These authors argue that those who undermine a tribe's abil-
ity to make such choices are racist for assuming that tribal
governments are too incompetent to decide for themselves. 18 2 In ad-
dition, they point out that while few options for business development
are available to tribes, not many tribes are considering such projects.
These proponents argue that the waste industry is not singling out
tribes, but that the NIMBY phenomenon and the fear of waste
problems have created media hype that tribes will be irresponsible in
treating waste. 83 They also point out that very little media attention
is paid to the far more significant problems of open and illegal dump-
ing on reservations."8
Some proponents have put forth plans which would allow tribes to
build facilities which would minimize environmental harm.' 8 If these
facilities are built, critics should be put at ease, because the truth is
that facilities to handle waste are essential, and the country cannot
continue to provide makeshift responses to waste. Thus, if tribes
maintain environmentally sound facilities, they will be providing a
long overdue, invaluable service.
The Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe, in New Mexico, is one tribe
which is considering hosting an interim nuclear waste facility. 8 6
179. Id.
180. See Lippman, supra note 1, at A3.
181. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 942.
182. Id. They believe that the implication of criticism of tribal waste projects is
"that Indians lack the intelligence to balance and protect adequately their own eco-
nomic and environmental interests. This is clearly a racist assumption; the same as-
sumption that guided the federal policies that very nearly eradicated Indian people m
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centunes." Id.
183. Id. at 935 (also noting that these projects are good development opportunities
since they do not require tribes to put forth capital to develop the project).
184. Id. at 934.
185. Id. at 936-41 (providing a detailed description of the plans of the Campo Band
of Mission Indians of California for a commercial solid waste project).
186. See Lippman, supra note 1, at A3.
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Under current plans, the tribe would devote approximately one
square mile of its 720 square mile area to store 10,000 metric tons of
irradiated fuel rods in sealed containers above ground.' 87 In making
their decision to proceed with plans for the facility, tribe members
have dealt both with internal conflicts and external political pressures.
However, leaders seem certain to move forward with plans, hoping
that such a facility would provide the necessary economic stimulus to
"continue the tribe into perpetuity.' 188
The Mescaleros charge outside environmentalists and neighboring
communities who oppose the project with undue paternalism and
"condescension."' 18 9 Tribal members do not want to be pressured by
outsiders, and give little weight to non-Indian views. They contend
that as long as the tribe achieves consensus, they alone should have
the power to decide whether to proceed."9
Tribal members contend that building the two billion dollar facility
would benefit the tribe, and society m general, without compromising
the environment. "Nuclear energy is a fact of life for all of us," said
the Tribal President, Wendall Chino.
We all have to deal with it in one way or another. Tis time, we as
[sic] tribe have chosen to meet it on our terms. Like our lands, our
integrity is sacred to us. We believe that our values can help create
a new approach to one of the nuclear problems facing our govern-
ment and country.' 91
There are complex issues involved in choosing to develop facilities.
While it may be true that attacking poverty and providing other serv-
ices are important priorities which must be addressed, Indian nations
cannot afford to wait until the U.S. government does so. Not all tribes
may think the waste industry is appropriate, but tribes should not be
demed that choice if proper safeguards exist.' 92
CONCLUSION
Federal Indian law has undergone constant change, culminating to-
day in limited recogmtion of tribal self-determination. Congress'
187 Id.
188. Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Storage Divides Apaches and Neighbors, N.Y.
Timxns, Nov. 11, 1993, at A18 (quoting Fred Peso, one of the eight members of the
elected tribal council and a head of the nuclear waste facility project). Although they
have misgivings about the project, tribe members assert that they must be able to
develop an economic base to provide employment for their people in order to be able
to keep young people on the reservation and to preserve the Indian heritage and way
of life.
189. Id.
190. See Satchell, supra note 1, at 24. Indian leaders charge that environmental
groups, like Greenpeace, have no right to determine "what is right and wrong for the
tribes." Id.
191. Lippman, supra note 1, at A3.
192. Gover & Walker, supra note 9, at 936.
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sweeping power over reservations has grown to cover most affairs and
has been virtually unchecked by the courts, making promises for In-
dian sovereignty token words with little substance behind them.
Environmental management on reservations may actually be a way
to strengthen tribes and to accord the sovereignty recognized by the
framers of the Constitution and the Marshall Court. By amending
laws like RCRA to treat tribes as states, tribes would be given the
money and support they need to remedy their environmental
problems, and the opportunity to engage in commercial development
without lingering questions of liability If Congress is truly commit-
ted to promoting tribal self-sufficiency, federal Indian policy must ad-
dress the need for business developments, like commercial waste
projects, and facilitate such opportunities by clarifying RCRA. This
power must be granted, if not to allow business development, then to
avert future open and illegal dumping on tribal lands. Without the
right to regulate their environment, tribes will continue to be unable
to protect their members from severe health and environmental
hazards, and their political integrity will be further compromised.
A. Cassidy Sehgal
